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INTRODUCTION: ALTERNATIVES IN SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 
Anamaria Fălăuş 
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) 
 
 
1. ALTERNATIVES IN SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 
 
In producing and interpreting sentences, speakers constantly process information 
about other things that could have been said. The alternative linguistic forms that a 
speaker chooses not to use often play a significant part in the grammaticality and 
felicity of an utterance in a given context. As a result, both semantic and pragmatic 
theories need to provide an explicit model of alternatives and their relation to 
assertions. The idea that the well formedness of sentences may be determined by a 
selection among competing forms or interpretations plays a key part in many 
linguistic phenomena and has been at the core of several theoretical frameworks.1 In 
semantics and pragmatics, the issue became more prominent when an increasing 
number of phenomena were argued to have a semantics that makes direct reference to 
alternatives. Among them, there are three main topics that have been extensively 
studied and constitute the primary sources of alternative semantics (i.e. semantics 
based on alternatives): questions (e.g. Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977, Groenendijk 
and Stokhof 1984, Hagstrom 1998, Shimoyama 2001, Lahiri 2002), focus (e.g. Rooth 
1985, 1992, Beck 2006, Wagner 2006, Beaver and Clark 2008), and implicatures (e.g. 
Horn 1972, 1989, Gazdar 1979, Hirschberg 1985, Levinson 2000, Zimmermann 2000, 
Chierchia 2004, Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007, Geurts 2010). Although the range of 
applications of alternative semantics has been constantly expanding, these are the 
domains that have shaped the definition of alternatives as semantic/pragmatic objects. 
The proposed alternative-based accounts make use of alternative sets, but do not 
necessarily rely on a common set of assumptions regarding alternatives. As we will 
see shortly, there are at least three main issues on the basis of which alternative-based 
systems can be distinguished, namely how they conceive (i) the source of alternatives, 
(ii) the mechanism underlying the generation of propositional alternatives, and (iii) 
the relation between alternatives and the assertion.  
The term alternative semantics (attributed by Rooth 1996 to von Stechow 
1989) currently designates (at least) two different alternative-based systems. One of 
them, also called Hamblin semantics, goes back to the analysis of questions proposed 
in Hamblin (1973). On this view, all expressions have sets of alternatives as their 
unique semantic value, which then combine with other constituents of the sentence in 
a compositional manner. A different alternative-based theory of interpretation, 
originating in Rooth (1985), assumes a ‘multi-dimensional’ semantics: alongside 
standard meanings, speakers recursively build up alternative sets that are accessed by 
alternative sensitive-operators. In this set-up, alternatives are introduced and 
computed separately from the regular semantic values. In the following, we briefly 
summarize the use of alternatives in each of these two systems, staying as close as 
possible to the original discussions. Next, we turn to a closely related area of 
investigation, namely implicatures, where the correct definition of alternatives has 
been the subject of intense debates. The goal is to provide an overview of the use of 
alternatives in these three areas of semantics and pragmatics and thus set the basis for 
a comparison among existing alternative-based systems. We conclude this section by 
laying out some of the theoretical and empirical issues raised by the application of 
alternative semantics to an increasing number of phenomena and pointing out some of 
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the questions that remain open at this stage. Section 2 summarizes the contents of the 
present volume and shows how the individual contributions address these issues.  
 
1.1 Questions  
 
Hamblin (1973) introduced the compositional computation of alternative sets to 
analyze questions in Montague grammar (without however employing the term 
alternative). On this account, the meaning of a question is the set of propositions that 
serve as its possible answers (see also Karttunen 1977, Groenendijk and Stokhof 
1984, Hagstrom 1998, Shimoyama 2001, Lahiri 2002 among others) 
(1) Who walks? 
 
According to Hamblin, a question such as (1) denotes “a set, namely, the set whose 
members are the propositions denoted by ‘Mary walks’, ‘John walks’, ... and so on for 
all individuals. Pragmatically speaking, a question sets up a choice-situation between 
a set of propositions, namely, those propositions that count as answers to it” (Hamblin 
1973:48). To compositionally derive this set of propositions, Hamblin proposes to 
replace denotations with denotation-sets, subsequently referred to as alternative sets 
(e.g. Ramchand 1997, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). For most lexical items, this 
amounts to equating their denotation to singleton sets of standard denotations: the 
semantic value of a proper name like Mary is {Mary}, i.e. the set whose unique 
member is Mary, the semantic value of an intransitive verb like walk is a singleton set 
containing the property ‘walk’, etc. The more interesting consequence of the switch to 
denotation-sets concerns interrogative words like who and what, which on this 
account denote non-singleton sets of alternatives: the set of humans and set of non-
humans respectively. Once we adopt this perspective, the component parts of Mary 
left and Who left? are identical. The outcome is a unified treatment of interrogative 
and declarative sentences, which on this view are the same kind of formal object, 
namely sets of propositions. In both cases, the sets denoted by the various constituents 
of the sentence combine in a compositional manner, via pointwise functional 
application resulting in a (possibly singleton) set of propositions, as sketched in (2) 
and (3) below. The composition rules apply the denotation of leave to each member of 
the set with which it combines, yielding a set containing one proposition (2), or 
several propositions, one for each individual in the who set (3): 
(2) a. Mary left. 
b. {that Mary left} 
(3) a. Who left? 
b. [[who]] = {x: x is a person} = {Mary, Paul, Linda,…} 
c. left ({Mary, Paul, Linda,…}) = {left (Mary), left (Paul), left (Linda), …} 
d. {that Mary left, that Paul left, that Linda left, …} 
Hamblin’s compositional analysis of questions constitutes the first attempt to use 
alternatives as a tool to formalize natural language constructions, but he didn’t use it 
systematically nor did he explore this any further. His paper however set the basis for 
the analysis of questions as sets of propositions (i.e. alternatives), pursued in much 
subsequent work (see Krifka 2011 for an overview). Opinion has varied as to whether 
the denotation of questions should be equated to the set of true answers (e.g. 
Karttunen 1977) or the set of all possible answers (Hamblin 1973, Groenendijk and 
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Stokhof 1984). The existing proposals also diverge on whether the relevant sets of 
propositions are derived by movement (Karttunen 1977) or not (Hamblin 1973).  
More importantly for our present purposes, Hamblin’s proposal also provided 
crucial insights for a non-movement, alternative-based analysis of wh-words in 
languages like Bengali (Ramchand 1997) or Japanese (e.g. Hagstrom 1998, 
Shimoyama 2001, and Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). Wh-indefinites in these 
languages, commonly referred to as indeterminates (following Kuroda 1965), are 
known to acquire a different interpretation depending on the operators with which 
they associate (e.g. interrogative, negative, quantificational). The following examples, 
taken from Shimoyama (2006), illustrate this behavior: 
(4) a. Dono  gakusei-mo  odotta.  
    which student-MO danced 
                ‘Every student danced.’ 
 b. [Dare-ga     odorimasu] ka?  
                  who-Nom dance          Q   
                 ‘Who dances?’  
 
The hypothesis that indeterminates are alternative-introducing elements provides a 
natural way to capture this variability. To illustrate, let us briefly review the 
influential proposal due to Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), which not only lays out 
the main components of a Hamblin semantics for Japanese indeterminates (building 
on Shimoyama 2001), but also constitutes the first detailed attempt to generalize this 
approach to a wider range of indefinites cross-linguistically. More specifically, on a 
par with interrogative words like who, indeterminate pronouns such as dare or dono 
are assumed to introduce sets of alternatives which expand (compositionally) until 
they find an operator that selects them. Alternatives can be of different types (e.g. 
individual, propositional) and as a consequence are accessible to both sentential and 
non-sentential (generalized) quantificational operators, which eventually determine 
the interpretation of the indeterminate. Crucially, the alternative-introducing element 
stays in situ, which means that there is no movement or binding relation between the 
operator and the alternatives it operates on. Their association is indirect and simply 
follows from the way semantic interpretation proceeds. As illustrated in (3) above, via 
(pointwise) functional application, individual alternatives can expand and give rise to 
alternatives of a higher type, e.g. propositional alternatives, which then get caught by 
a sentential operator, such as the ones in (5) (taken from Kratzer and Shimoyama 
2002:8):  
(5)  For [[α]]w,g ⊆ D
<s,t>
: 
  a. [[∃α]]w,g = {λw’. ∃p [p ∈ [[α]]w,g and p(w’) = 1] }  
b. [[∀α]]w,g = {λw’. ∀p [p ∈ [[α]] w,g → p(w’) = 1] } 
 
The contribution of the indeterminate remains constant, i.e. a set of alternatives, its 
different readings being the result of associating with different operators. When a set 
of propositional alternatives combines with the existential operator defined in (5a), it 
yields the proposition that is true in case at least one alternative in the relevant set is 
true. The universal quantifier defined in (5b) yields the proposition that is true in case 
every alternative in the relevant set is true. Similar alternative-sensitive meanings are 
defined for other quantificational and propositional operators. 
The proposed semantics is exploited to derive a wide range of properties: 
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interpretational variability, locality restrictions, intervention effects or concord 
phenomena. For example, the alternatives introduce by an indeterminate expand until 
they meet a suitable operator such as interrogative -ka or universal -mo. Since there is 
no movement involved, this kind of compositional system is not sensitive to island 
boundaries. Accordingly, there is nothing that would prevent the alternatives 
introduced by indeterminates within islands from being selected by an interrogative 
operator. But crucially, they must associate with the first available operator, without 
‘skipping’ any possible operator, which explains why the configuration in (6), a 
typical intervention effect, is ruled out: 
 
(6) * [....[.... indeterminate .... ka/mo]......]-ka/mo 
 
This briefly illustrates the way in which Hamblin semantics captures the 
behavior of indeterminates. This kind of alternative-based approach has been 
extended to indefinites which do not display a similar interpretational variability, but 
whose behavior is nevertheless sensitive to the presence of certain operators, such as 
negation or modals (e.g. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Kratzer 2005; Menéndez-
Benito 2005; Yanovich 2005; Arregui 2006; Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 
2010 among others). These accounts share the assumption that indefinites denote sets 
of (individual) alternatives, which grow compositionally and can be selected by 
different alternative-sensitive operators. The applications of the alternative-based 
framework proposed by Hamblin are not limited to interrogatives and indefinites. 
Other phenomena and constructions that received analyses couched in a Hamblin 
semantics include evidentials (Murray 2009), comparatives (Morzycki 2010), 
conditional structures (Rawlins 2008), or disjunction or other scalar terms (Alonso-
Ovalle 2006, Keshet 2006).  
 
1.2 Focus 
 
In contrast to the ‘one-dimensional’ system introduced by Hamblin, other theories of 
interpretation assume a ‘multi-dimensional’ semantics, where alternatives are kept 
separate from standard meanings. Rooth (1985, 1992) developed an influential 
alternative-based semantics for focus, in which the function of focus is to evoke 
alternatives (an intuition that goes back to Jackendoff 1972). On this theory, natural 
language expressions have two semantic values: an ordinary semantic value and a 
secondary, focus semantic value. The former is the regular semantic value assigned 
by the interpretation function, marked as [[.]]o in Rooth (1992), e.g. [[Mary]]o = Mary. 
The focus value of an expression – marked [[.]]f – is the set comprising its 
alternatives, i.e. a set of meanings of the same semantic type (also referred to as p-
sets). Rooth shows that the set of focus alternatives of a complex constituent can be 
derived compositionally by taking the focus values of its subconstituents and applying 
the usual semantic rules to them, as defined in (7) (taken from Rooth 1996:281): 
(7) a. The focus semantic value of a focused phrase of semantic type τ is the set of 
possible denotations of type τ. 
b. The focus semantic value of a non-focused lexical item is the unit set 
of its ordinary semantic value. 
c. Let α be a non-focused complex phrase with component phrases α1,…,αk and 
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let φ be the semantic rule for α, e.g. function application. The focus semantic 
value of α: is the set things obtainable as φ(x1,...,xk), where x1 ∈ [[α1]]f ∧ ... ∧ 
xk ∈ [[αk]]f 
 
The focus semantic value of a non-focus marked constituent is equal to its regular 
denotation, or more precisely the singleton containing its regular denotation. If a 
constituent is focus marked, its focus semantic value is the set of alternative meanings 
construed by replacing the denotation of the focused expression with an object of the 
same semantic type. For illustration, consider the example in (8), with the ordinary 
semantic values in (8a) and the focus semantic values in (8b): 
(8)  JOHNF saw Lisa. 
 a. [[JohnF]]o = John 
     [[Lisa]]o = Lisa 
     [[saw]]o = λy.λx.saw(x,y) 
     [[saw]]o([[Lisa]]o)([[JohnF]]o) = saw(John,Lisa) 
b. [[JohnF]]f = De 
     [[Lisa]]f = {[[Lisa]]o }={Lisa} 
     [[saw]]f = {[[saw]]o }={λy.λx.saw(x,y)} 
     [[saw]]f([[Lisa]]f) = {[[saw]]o([[Lisa]]o)} = {λx.saw(x, Lisa)} 
     [[saw Lisa]]f ([[JohnF]]f) = {saw(x, Lisa)| x ∈ De} 
The focus semantic value of the focused constituent is determined by the rule in (7a); 
since [[JohnF]]o is of type e, this is the set of individuals. The focus values of the non-
focused constituents Lisa, saw and saw Lisa consist of the singletons containing their 
respective ordinary semantic values, as defined in (7b). The VP combines through 
pointwise functional application with each member in the set of alternatives to John. 
This yields the focus value of the whole sentence, namely the set of propositions of 
the form x saw Lisa, where x is an entity.  
 Focus meanings are relevant for a variety of expressions in language, 
expressions which are said to associate with focus, e.g. focus-sensitive particles such 
as only or even. In Rooth’s system, they operate over focus alternatives and 
incorporate them into the ordinary meaning of the sentences where they occur. 
Different positions of focus determine different alternative sets, which once combined 
with the lexical semantics of a focus-sensitive expression, result in different truth-
conditions. Consider the following examples:  
 (9) a. John only introduced Bill to [Sue]F. 
b. John only introduced [Bill]F to Sue. 
The ordinary value of the two sentences is identical, unlike their focus values. 
According to the rules in (7) above, the focus value contains propositions of the form 
John introduced Bill to x for (9a), and propositions of the form John introduced x to 
Sue for (9b), where x is a variable of type e. Once only is computed, the resulting 
meaning of (9a) is that “John introduced Bill to Sue” and any other proposition in the 
set of alternatives is false, i.e. John introduced Bill to Sue and to no one else. In (9b), 
only takes a different alternative set and the derived interpretation is  “John introduced 
Bill and no one else to Sue”. This provides a simple illustration of the truth-
conditional effect of focus-induced alternatives.  
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Rooth’s theory, in which focus introduces sets of alternatives, built up 
compositionally alongside standard meanings, has been applied to a variety of focus-
related phenomena. These include question-answer congruence, VP-ellipsis and 
anaphora, focus on contrastive pairs, focus-induced conversational implicatures, 
superlatives, generic sentences, or as illustrated above, the focus sensitivity of 
expressions like only, even, also or too (for extensive reviews, see e.g. Kadmon 2001, 
Beaver and Clark 2008, Hinterwimmer 2011).  
As discussed in Rooth (1992, 1996), alternative semantics (similarly to 
another influential approach to focus, namely structured meanings, e.g. von Stechow 
1991, Krifka 1992) is a useful tool in describing and characterizing the contribution of 
focus to the interpretation of a given focus-sensitive construction. However, the 
theory just sketched lacks an explanatory level. Without further amendments, 
alternative semantics fails to provide a theory of focus licensing. Such a theory should 
be able to explain what focus-sensitive constructions have in common and what kinds 
of semantic or pragmatic functions focus can serve. Rooth (1992, 1996) shows that 
such a theory can be developed in alternative semantics by building the restricting 
role of context on the interpretation of sentences with focused constituents into the 
system. In the following, we will briefly illustrate Rooth’s theory of focus licensing. 
Note however that Rooth (1996) acknowledges that the arguments in favor of 
alternative semantics over other approaches to focus (such as structured meanings) are 
not conclusive.  
In the framework introduced above, the meaning of a sentence with a focus 
marked constituent is determined by lexical meaning, syntax and the position of 
focus. However, this fails to capture the role of context in determining the set of 
alternatives. The assumption that alternatives are type-driven clearly over-generates. 
Focus-sensitive operators do not operate over the entire focus set, but rather over a 
contextually relevant set, as illustrated in (10) (Rooth 1996:279), where the set of 
propositions to which only applies consists of just three propositions:  
  
(10)  John brought Tom, Bill, and Harry to the party, but he only introduced BillF to 
Sue. 
The question then becomes how to constrain the set of alternatives to incorporate this 
context-dependence. Rooth proposes that for focus to be felicitous, the generated set 
of alternatives needs to be related to a denotation C in the near discourse. C consists 
of contextually available sets of alternatives and its value is determined by contextual 
or pragmatic information. Focus does not directly set the reference for C, but it does 
constrain it. Specifically, focus interpretation contributes constraints on the relation 
between C and the focus alternative set. One such condition holds that C should be a 
subset of the focus semantic value of a given sentence. Formally, Rooth assumes that 
such constraints are always introduced as presuppositions via the ~ operator, the 
operator responsible for focus interpretation, as stated in (11) below (Rooth 1996:285) 
 (11) Where φ is a syntactic phrase and C is a syntactically covert semantic 
variable φ ~ C introduces the presupposition that C is a subset of [[φ]]f 
containing [[φ]]o and at least one other element. 
To give an example of how this operator handles focus licensing, let us consider the 
following question-answer pair: 
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(12)  Q: Who saw Lisa? 
 A: [John]F saw Lisa.  
  a. C = [Who saw Lisa?] 
 b. [JohnF saw Lisa] ∼ C 
 c. [φ ∼ C] is felicitous if C ⊆ [[φ]]f 
 
The denotation of the question in (12) is the set of propositions that qualify as answers 
(following Hamblin 1973, see section 1.1), i.e. the set of propositions {that Paul saw 
Lisa, that John saw Lisa, that Linda saw Lisa, . . .}. The focus value of the answer is 
identical – it contains propositions of the form x saw Lisa, where x is an individual (or 
a group of individuals). The ∼ operator requires that the meaning of the question is a 
subset of the focus semantic value of the answer (12c). Since this requirement is 
satisfied in (12), focus on John is licensed. If on the other hand, the question had been 
Who did John see?, denoting the set of propositions {that John saw Lisa, that John 
saw Paul, that John saw Linda…}, C wouldn’t have been a subset of the focus value 
of the answer in (12) and so focus on John would not have been licensed. 
 In the case of a focus-sensitive operator like only, focus is licensed if the 
domain of quantification of only, namely C, is a subset of the focus semantic value. 
The sentence in (9a) for example gets the following representation: 
 
(13) [only C [[John introduced BillF to Sue] ∼ C]]  
 
Once again, focus simply requires that C, the set of contextually relevant alternatives 
with which only combines, is a subset of the focus semantic value of John introduced 
BillF to Sue (consisting of propositions of the form John introduced x to Sue). If this 
constraint is satisfied, only simply states that the assertion (and its entailments) is the 
only true proposition in C. This derives the appropriately restricted meaning for (10) 
above. 
In the system just sketched, there is no construction-specific rule for the 
interpretation of focus. In each case, it is presupposed that there is some contextually 
relevant set of alternatives, independently available. For a wh-question, the relevant 
set is the denotation of the question, for an alternative question like Does Ede want 
coffee or tea, the set consists of the propositions Ede wants coffee and Ede wants tea, 
etc. If there is no such salient set of alternatives already in the context, 
accommodation comes in. This explains why focus is perceived as deviant in out of 
the blue contexts, such as (14a), but perfectly felicitous when the context supplies a 
suitable set of alternatives (14b): 
(14)  a. Upon arriving at the tourist information office: 
      # I want information on [hotels]F. 
b. A: Do you need information on accommodation, transportation or  
         activities?  
         B: I want information on [hotels]F. 
This kind of contrast indicates that focus activates alternatives which need to be made 
sense of, a process in which context plays a crucial role. 
It should be mentioned that the exhaustive inference derived in (12) and (13) 
above, whereby the denotation of the uttered sentence is the only one that is true out 
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of the set of focus alternatives, can also surface in the absence of overt focus-sensitive 
expressions. Chierchia (to appear) provides the following example: 
    
(15)   Yesterday, John eventually decided to show up at the party. He walked in, 
grabbed a drink, greeted everybody, kissed Paul and Sue, and then left. 
 
The sequence in (15) conveys that John only kissed Paul and Sue (among the guests), 
even in the absence of an overt only or even focal stress. As originally proposed in 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), exhaustivity effects can be derived in terms of a 
phonologically null operator (akin to only). This operator can occur in a question-
answer pair like (12) or in statements such as (15), yielding an effect similar to overt 
focus.      
Let us summarize the main components of the alternative-based approach to 
focus in the bi-dimensional set-up developed by Rooth. Focus is uniformly assumed 
to evoke alternatives, which are kept separate from ordinary semantic values. 
Alternatives are derived compositionally and are operated over by alternative-
sensitive operators like only or even (which can sometimes be covert). The relation 
between alternative sets and alternative sensitive operators is syntactically encoded 
(via the ∼ operator). This latter component of the theory constitutes an important 
move in alternative semantics insofar as it shows how a compositional treatment of 
alternatives can incorporate contextual restrictions. Rooth thus provides an explicit 
model of how to generate, compute and constrain alternatives. 
 However, this framework has been argued to have difficulties accounting for 
cases of multiple foci. Kratzer (1991) shows that alternative semantics fails to capture 
cases like the following: 
(16) I only went to [Tanglewood]F because you did.  
Assuming that the elided VP in (16) is interpreted by copying the missing VP from 
the antecedent VP and deleting duplicated material, we obtain (17): 
(17) I only went to [Tanglewood]F because you did [go to [Tanglewood]F]. 
Intuitively, the sentence in (16) says that there is only one value of X that makes I 
only went to X because you went to X true, namely the value where X = Tanglewood. 
Alternative semantics however produces different, incorrect interpretations. In 
particular, it allows the two foci to vary independently. This means that the set of 
alternatives could include any proposition of the form I only went to X because you 
went to Y, which would incorrectly predict (16) to allow the continuation I didn’t go 
to Block Island because you went to Elk Lake Lodge. The dependency between the 
two focus values appears not be captured by the alternative-based mechanism 
introduced above (as discussed in detail in e.g. Kadmon 2001, Krifka 2006). Various 
solutions have been proposed in the literature, relying on focus indices and 
assignment functions (Kratzer 1991), a more general mechanism of structure-sharing 
(Sauerland 2007) or a dynamic treatment of ellipsis, which comes out as a special 
case of anaphora (Beaver and Clark 2008). Such amendments to the original theory 
make it possible to maintain that alternative semantics can adequately model focus 
sensitivity. 
Analyses couched in a multi-dimensional alternative semantics have been 
explored for several phenomena, more or less directly connected with focus, such as 
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topics (Büring 1997), intervention effects (e.g. Beck 1996, 2006; Kim 2002; Mayr 
2010), polarity sensitivity (e.g. Krifka 1995; Lahiri 1998; Chierchia 2006, to appear; 
Crnič 2011) or implicature calculation, a topic discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
1.3 Implicatures 
 
The alternative-based accounts couched in either Hamblin- or Rooth-style semantics 
are mainly concerned with the use of alternatives, i.e. how alternatives combine in the 
course of semantic composition and how this determines the properties of various 
phenomena. Alternative sets are typically assumed to be semantically determined 
(mainly type-driven), with some kind of mechanism to prevent over-generation and 
incorporate contextual restrictions. With these assumptions in place, there has been 
little discussion on where alternatives come from and what exactly counts as a ‘good’ 
alternative (see however Cohen 1999 or Wagner 2010). The situation is very different 
in the study of implicatures, in particular scalar implicatures, an area of semantics and 
pragmatics where alternatives have received a lot of attention. Since implicatures rely 
on reasoning about alternatives, i.e. other things the speaker could have said, the 
reasoning can only go through if the ‘right’ alternatives are considered. In this 
context, it becomes important to explain how exactly alternatives are determined.  
To illustrate, imagine the utterance in (18a) in a context where we discuss the 
number of bilinguals in the Basque Country:  
 
(18)   a. Some of my students speak Basque. 
 b. All of my students speak Basque. 
 
The use of the quantifier some in (18a) typically gives rise to the inference that not all 
students in the relevant context speak Basque. As is well-known since the seminal 
work of Grice (1975/1989), this inference comes about from reasoning about the 
intentions of the speaker and the motivation for uttering (18a), rather than some other, 
alternative utterance. A plausible informal reconstruction of the reasoning underlying 
the above-mentioned implicature goes as follows. The speaker chose to utter (18a) 
instead of (18b), which would have also been relevant. (18b) is more informative (i.e. 
asymmetrically entails (18a)). If the speaker had known that the sentence with all is 
true, she would have said so. On the assumption that the speaker is cooperative and 
has an opinion as to whether (18b) is true, this implies that the speaker takes (18b) to 
be false.  
A crucial component in the reasoning just sketched is (18b), the alternative 
utterance to which the assertion is being compared. This raises two related questions: 
(i) what are the alternatives that are considered by the hearer and (ii) how do these 
alternatives relate to the assertion? Many factors determine what counts as a ‘good’ 
alternative. In the reasoning above, we used notions like relevance and informativity, 
which clearly play a key part in the calculation of the correct implicature. Consider 
the following sentences: 
 
(19) a. Some of my students speak Basque and have blue eyes. 
b. Some of my students speak Basque and some of my students don’t speak 
Basque. 
c. Some but not all of my students speak Basque. 
 d. Only some of my students speak Basque.   
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Strictly speaking, the sentence in (19a) is more informative than (18a), but is not the 
alternative we are considering to derive the scalar implicature. A plausible reason is 
that (19a) is unlikely to be relevant in the context of a discussion about bilingualism, 
which would explain why we do not apply the reasoning illustrated for (18b). 
However, relevance considerations cannot exclude (19b-d) from the set of 
alternatives, for each one of these three sentences is more informative than the 
assertion and at least equally relevant. By the reasoning above, the hearer would be 
predicted to derive wrong implicatures. For instance, negating (19c) and adding this 
to the initial utterance yields Some of my students speak Basque and it is not the case 
that some but not all of my students speak Basque. This is equivalent to All of my 
students speak Basque, which in fact contradicts the actual implicature of (18a), 
clearly a wrong result. These simple examples demonstrate the importance of the right 
notion of alternatives in a theory of (scalar) implicatures. There is an extensive 
literature on implicatures, with lively debates on where, why and how exactly such 
inferences are derived (for recent reviews, see e.g. Sauerland 2012; Chierchia, Fox, 
and Spector 2012; Schlenker 2012). For our present purposes, we limit the discussion 
to the notion of alternative that is relevant for implicature calculation and review the 
various factors that have been argued to determine the correct alternatives. 
These issues were not addressed by Grice, but they have been at the core of 
neo-Gricean approaches to implicatures (e.g. Horn 1972, 1984, 1989, Gazdar 1979, 
Atlas and Levinson 1981, Sauerland 2004, Geurts 2010, among many others). In 
particular, Horn (1972) introduces the notion of scales, i.e. more or less 
conventionalized sets of lexical items ordered by entailment, exemplified in (20) 
(Horn 1989: 232): 
 (20) a. <all, most, many, some> 
b. <and, or>  
c. <must, should, may> 
d. <always, usually, often, sometimes> 
e. <..., 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1>  
f. <none, not all> 
g. <necessary, (logically) possible> 
h. <certain, {probable/likely}, possible> 
i. <boiling, hot, warm> 
j. <adore, love, like> 
 
As these examples illustrate, scales are typically represented as ordered n-tuples of 
lexical items, with each element understood as entailing the elements to its right. Or 
and and are said to be scale-mates, where scale-mate-of is a symmetric relation. Once 
we adopt scales of this kind, known as quantitative or Horn scales, the alternatives to 
a sentence S considered in the course of implicature calculation consist of the set of 
S’, where S’ is obtained by (possibly successive) replacement(s) of an expression with 
one of its scale-mates.2 If the derived alternative is stronger, the reasoning sketched 
above triggers a scalar implicature. 
This straightforwardly captures the relation between (18a) and (18b) and 
provides an explanation for the absence of (19c) from the set of alternatives: some 
cannot compete with some but not all because they don’t occur on the same scale. 
This result has been taken to support the existence of such lexically determined sets of 
alternatives. However, subsequent work has shown that the notion of scale as defined 
above needs further refinements (e.g. Fauconnier 1975, Gazdar 1979, Atlas and 
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Levinson 1981, Hirschberg 1985, Matsumoto 1995, Israel 2011). More specifically, it 
has been pointed out that scale-mates need to be “of the same form class, in the same 
dialect or register, lexicalized to the same degree […] and "about" the same semantic 
relations” (Levinson 2000:79). For example, the different degree of lexicalization 
prevents iff and if from being part of the same scale. Similarly, since regret introduces 
a semantic component (i.e. negative feeling or attitude) that is absent in know, the two 
factive verbs cannot be scale-mates. Moreover, Horn (1989) shows that scales are also 
subject to a monotonicity constraint: a scale cannot simultaneously include ‘positive’ 
(upward-entailing) and ‘negative’ (downward entailing) elements. Some and none for 
example cannot be scale-mates because positive and negative quantifiers belong to 
different scales. Yet, even once such additional factors are taken into account, the 
definition of scales in terms of semantic entailment remains too narrow. Fauconnier 
(1975) and Hirschberg (1985) discuss a variety of examples showing that actual 
entailments are not necessary for scalar implicatures. As illustrated by the examples in 
(21), some scales can be pragmatically established: 
 
(21) a. A: Do they have any preschoolers in the program?  
    B: They have toddlers. 
  b. A: Is she married?  
                B: She’s engaged. 
c. A: Did John mail his application?  
    B: He wrote it. 
 d. A: Did you get Paul Newman's autograph? 
    B: I got Joanne Woodward's. 
 
In each of these cases, there is an ordering relation that supports the kind of scalar 
reasoning involved in scalar implicatures which is not based on logical entailment. 
Hirschberg argues that the relations that define (possibly ad hoc) scales include only 
those relations that define partially ordered sets (POSETS). As long as speakers can 
create such a set, the scalar reasoning goes through. The classical Horn scales 
obviously fall under this heading, as a case where the ordering relation is entailment. 
 However, scale-based lexical replacements are not sufficient to derive all the 
necessary alternatives. This has been shown in particular for disjunction, in examples 
like the following: 
(22) John ate the apple or the pear. 
The sentence gives rise to an exclusiveness inference, that John did not eat both the 
apple and the pear. Like before, this inference can be derived by assuming that the 
conjunction is a scale-mate of or. However, this assumption cannot derive the 
ignorance inference triggered by (22), namely that the speaker doesn’t know which 
one of the disjuncts holds. Sauerland (2004) offers a solution to this problem by 
including in the set of alternatives not only the conjunction, but also each one of the 
disjuncts, i.e. John ate the apple and John ate the pear. This move however has been 
shown to be problematic insofar as it generates too many implicatures: if p or q has as 
its scale-mates p and q, it follows that p and q are scale-mates of each other, 
regardless of what they are, a clearly undesirable result. Similarly, if p has as its 
alternative p or q, then not [p or q] is an alternative of not p; asserting not p should 
therefore trigger the inference that p or q is true (i.e. not [not [p or q]]), which 
together with not p implicates that q is true (for details and further discussion see 
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Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007 and Schlenker 2012).  
 In view of the problems mentioned above, there are recent attempts to develop 
a theory of alternatives that does not rely on scales. Katzir (2008), followed by Fox 
and Katzir (2011), proposes a syntactic procedure to compute alternatives, in which 
the possible replacements of a constituent is the set of all constituents that are at most 
equally complex. Specifically, the proposed procedure is defined as in (23) below 
(Fox and Katzir 2011:97): 
  
(23) a. S’ is an alternative of S if S’ can be derived from S by successive replacements  
  of sub-constituents of S with elements of the substitution source for S in C  
      b. The substitution source for X in a context C is the union of the following sets: 
(i) The lexicon  
(ii) The sub-constituents of X  
(iii) The set of salient constituents in C  
 
This more sophisticated algorithm, which makes no direct reference to the notion of 
scales, is argued to preserve the results of scale-based procedures and to derive the 
correct alternatives in more complex cases. In the case of disjunction for example, it 
is clear that p is a member of the substitution source of p or q; the reverse does not 
hold: there is no substitution operation which can derive p or q from p (see Fox and 
Katzir 2011 for further details). 
 This brief overview of alternatives in the theory of implicatures suggests that 
there is no single decisive factor in determining the alternatives in a given context. A 
related point of contention in the literature is the computation of these alternatives 
(however obtained). Without getting into details, ‘pragmatic’ theories of implicatures 
(most recently defended in Geurts 2010) assume that these inferences arise from 
reasoning about why the speaker chose a particular utterance. Crucially, this 
reasoning can only take place at the level of complete utterances, which means that 
implicature calculation (and thus the consideration of alternatives) is a global, post-
compositional phenomenon. In contrast to this, ‘grammatical’ theories of implicatures 
(most recently defended in Chierchia, Fox, and Spector 2012) assume that scalar 
implicatures can also be computed compositionally, and as such can arise at 
embedded levels. Consequently, on this approach, alternatives can be accessed and 
processed in the computational system of grammar (possibly via a covert 
exhaustification mechanism, similar to the one invoked for focus). This matter has 
been the subject of a lively and ongoing debate, with sophisticated empirical and 
conceptual arguments, which we cannot review here (see Sauerland 2012 for a recent 
overview of the existing approaches). The points discussed above should nevertheless 
suffice to establish the fact that a successful theory of implicatures cannot dispense 
with an explicit model of how to generate and compute alternatives.  
  
1.4 Main questions and open issues 
 
In the previous sections, we reviewed the use of alternatives in semantics and 
pragmatics by focusing on the three domains that arguably constitute the primary 
sources of alternative semantics: questions, focus and implicatures. In each case, we 
introduced the main assumptions concerning alternatives and the way in which they 
capture the phenomena under consideration, and we outlined some of the aspects that 
led to further adjustments. As previously noted, the notion of alternatives has been 
approached from different perspectives in the three areas of investigation we have 
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examined. Whereas theories of implicatures focused on the appropriate relation 
among (mainly lexical) alternatives, the literature on focus and questions paid more 
attention to the compositional derivation of propositional alternatives. Going beyond 
these phenomena, there are three main questions emerging from the constantly 
expanding applications of alternative semantics, on the basis of which alternative-
based theories can be distinguished: (i) the source of alternatives, (ii) the mechanism 
underlying the generation of propositional alternatives, and (iii) the relation between 
alternatives and the assertion.  
The first concerns the source of alternatives. In the discussion above, we have 
seen that alternatives can be induced by certain lexical items, by focus or by context. 
Consider the sentences in (24) below: 
 
(24) a. Some students wrote to the dean. 
 b. Some students wrote to the DEAN. 
 
In both cases, the speaker asserts that some students (in the relevant context of 
utterance) wrote to the dean. The enriched meaning is however different in each case, 
depending on the alternatives considered by the conversation participants. For 
example, in addition to the asserted meaning, the sentence in (24a) might 
communicate that not all students wrote to the dean, an inference derived by assuming 
that the use of the word some triggers the activation of its scale-mate all. If 
contextually relevant, (24a) could also implicate that only a small number of students 
wrote to the dean, i.e. It is not the case that most students wrote to the dean, an 
implicature that follows from the activation of the more fine-grained scale which 
includes some and most. Upon hearing (24a), it is also possible to infer that the 
students didn’t meet with the dean, for example when used as an answer to the 
question Did anybody meet with the dean to talk about the strike?. On the other hand, 
the sentence in (24b) communicates that some students wrote to the dean, as opposed 
to, say, writing to the department chair. This interpretation is clearly due to the 
presence of focus on ‘dean’. Examples of this kind illustrate how different sets of 
alternatives lead to different enriched meanings of a given sentence (and as such 
affect its felicity in a given context), despite the fact that the asserted meaning is 
identical. The question is what exactly triggers the relevant set of alternatives. In 
(24a), and analogous cases of scalar implicatures, it seems to be the use of a lexical 
item that belongs to a lexicalized scale (some) or to an ad hoc scale (getting in contact 
by writing to someone, as opposed to meeting in person). As mentioned in the 
discussion of scales in section 1.3, there is currently no consensus on where 
quantitative scales come from and what the principles governing the formation of 
(grammaticalized or ad hoc) scales are. Focus alternatives on the other hand are 
generally type-driven, i.e. the focused constituent determines the relevant set of 
alternatives, which are obtained by replacing the focused constituent with an element 
of the same semantic type (a procedure supplemented with some kind of mechanism 
to integrate the role of context). In the case of questions, alternatives come about in 
virtue of the presence of an interrogative word or operator (possibly covert), which 
plays a crucial part in deriving the set of propositions that constitutes the denotation 
of the question (regardless of the underlying mechanism, in situ or movement-based). 
The more general question is what are the possible sources of alternatives and what is 
the role of grammar and context in determining them.   
A second and related question is how phrasal alternatives are determined. If 
certain items or constituents activate alternatives, how do these combine with the 
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other constituents in the sentence to generate sets of propositional alternatives 
(accessed by alternative-sensitive operators)? At least three different mechanisms 
have been proposed in the literature: in situ, movement-based or structure-based 
systems. The first one assumes that the alternative-introducing element stays in situ 
and relies on special composition rules to combine sets. One such rule is the pointwise 
functional application illustrated in (3) above, whereby alternatives expand, i.e. give 
rise to alternatives of a higher type. This is the system employed in Hamblin (1973) 
and Rooth (1992) and much subsequent work in alternative semantics. Further 
developments of this mechanism led to the definition of other alternative-friendly 
rules of composition (e.g. the rule of Predicate abstraction in Kratzer and Shimoyama 
2002, carefully discussed in Romero and Novel’s contribution to this volume) or 
related in situ mechanisms (e.g. the system in Kratzer 1991, which relies on focus 
variables and dedicated assignment functions).  
Another option, pursued mainly for the semantics of questions (following 
Karttunen 1977), and to a lesser extent for focus (e.g. Wagner 2005), is a movement-
based system of generating alternatives. For illustration, consider a wh-question, 
where the resulting propositional alternatives only differ with respect to the value of 
the wh-word: 
 
(25) a. Which book did John read? 
b. {that John read The Magic Mountain, that John read The Brothers 
Karamazov, …} 
   
In a Karttunen-style theory of questions, this interpretation is obtained by treating the 
wh-phrase as an existential quantifier and by assuming that it moves to adjoin to a so-
called proto-question, i.e. the phrase headed by the interrogative operator ?. A 
simplified Logical Form for (25) looks as in (26a) and the resulting interpretation as 
in (26b): 
 
(26) a. [CP which book1 ? [IP John read t1]] 
b. λp.∃x[book(x) & p = read(John, x)]  
The operation that turns declarative-type semantic values into interrogative-type 
semantic values (sets of propositions) hinges on the propositional variable p over 
which lambda abstraction can take place. Crucially, the fronted wh-expression must 
be interpreted outside the scope of this variable (for discussion see e.g. Heim 2001). 
The assumption that wh-phrases move (together with the assumption that an 
interrogative operator is present in the structure) delivers the correct interpretation of 
the question, which on this approach amounts to the right set of propositions. 
 Sets of alternatives, in particular focus alternatives, have also been argued to 
obtain via a structure-based mechanism, which consists of a series of replacement 
operations (Fox 2000, Sauerland 2007, Katzir 2008, Fox and Katzir 2011). This view 
maintains a syntactic definition of alternatives, as opposed to lexically-driven or type-
driven replacements of the alternative-introducing element. Essentially, alternatives 
are obtained by (series of) replacements, where each step replaces a focus-marked 
phrase with a phrase of the same syntactic category. This procedure has been argued 
to derive the dependency between elided constituents and their focus-marked 
antecedents and to avoid the problems raised by lexically determined scales (as 
discussed in section 1.3 above).  
 With the notable exception of Fox and Katzir (2011), who argue for a similar 
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system of generating alternatives for implicature and focus effects, different 
mechanisms have been employed for different phenomena. Do we need all these 
mechanisms, with different alternative-generating procedures playing a role in 
different phenomena? Or could one of the proposed methods be used to uniformly 
derive phrasal alternatives, regardless of their sources? 
 The third main question that can differentiate alternative-based accounts 
concerns the way in which alternatives relate to the asserted meaning. In the case of 
questions, the denotation is identical to the set of propositions that qualify as answers, 
and as such, alternatives and ‘asserted’ (i.e. interrogative) meaning cannot be 
distinguished. In the case of focus alternatives, we saw that in the system developed 
by Rooth, the association is indirect, and is established via a focus-sensitive operator, 
which incorporates them into the ordinary meaning. Crucially, in this system, 
alternatives are kept separate from basic meanings, unlike in Hamblin semantics, 
where standard semantic values are uniformly equated to alternative sets. The 
alternatives responsible for scalar implicatures have also recently been argued to enter 
semantic composition. Just like in the case of focus, they are used by alternative-
sensitive (i.e. exhaustivity) operators. In alternative-based theories of questions and 
focus, alternatives are obligatorily computed. Implicatures on the other hand, and 
hence the alternatives on which they are based, are not obligatory. Alternatives are 
activated only if relevant in a given context and if their computation leads to meaning 
enrichment (a result obtained by excluding any alternative stronger than the 
assertion).  
A recent trend in the literature seeks to unify the computation of alternatives 
involved in focus and implicatures. As mentioned above, the grammatical theory of 
implicatures attributes implicature calculation to a covert grammatical operator, with 
a semantics very similar to only, generally referred to as EXH or O (see Chierchia to 
appear and Schlenker 2012 for detailed discussions of the issues raised by the various 
exhaustivity operators proposed in the literature). The empirical motivation typically 
offered in favor of this mechanism comes from exhaustive interpretations that arise in 
the absence of an operator like only, such as (15) above or question-answer pairs (as 
originally discussed in Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). If such an exhaustification 
mechanism can be shown to be available in the grammar, it is conceivable that it will 
operate in more than one construction (a line of thinking explicitly pursued in Fox and 
Katzir 2011).3 This opens the way for further extensions and raises the question of 
whether the different phenomena that have been treated in terms of alternatives 
should receive a unified analysis whereby alternative-induced meaning enrichment 
always comes about via an exhaustification procedure. There are however important 
open questions concerning exhaustivity operators and the corresponding 
exhaustification procedures. Among them, how is their insertion constrained? Is their 
insertion governed by a principle of Maximize Strength, whereby the application of 
EXH needs to increase informativity (as proposed in e.g. Chierchia to appear)? More 
generally, at what point in the derivation are alternatives considered and exploited to 
enrich the asserted meaning? What are the principles governing meaning enrichment 
that results from consideration of alternatives? Although we will not review this here, 
it should be mentioned that there is a growing body of experimental work which 
investigates the connections between these phenomena (see Chemla and Spector 
2011, Chemla, Homer and Rothschild 2011 for recent references). The constantly 
evolving experimental techniques can deliver rich data and provide new insights that 
could adjudicate between different theoretical models, as well as evaluate the 
robustness of the relation between different phenomena. 
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For presentational purposes, the three phenomena and the corresponding 
alternative-based systems were introduced separately, but there are clear connections 
between them. As noticed by Rooth himself (1992: 84) and often pointed out in 
subsequent work (e.g. Hagstrom 2003, Kratzer 2005, Szabolcsi, Wang and Zu 2012), 
the set of focus alternatives is very similar to Hamblin’s set of possible answers to the 
corresponding question. The Hamblin denotation of a question like Who saw Lisa? is 
the set of propositions of the form x saw Lisa, just like the focus meanings of a 
sentence like JOHNF saw Lisa, in (8) above. Moreover, alternatives are built and 
expanded in the same way, through pointwise functional application. For this reason, 
compositionally derived alternative sets are often referred to as Rooth/Hamblin-
alternatives. However, there are fundamental differences between the two systems. 
First, as previously mentioned, the relation between alternatives and ordinary 
semantic values. Hamblin’s framework is ‘one-dimensional’, in the sense that 
ordinary semantic values are sets of alternatives. In contrast to this, in the multi-
dimensional setting developed by Rooth, alternatives are kept separate from standard 
meanings: whenever active, alternative sets are computed separately from regular 
denotations, and factored into meaning by alternative-sensitive operators. In the 
former system, an indefinite like a man is interpreted as the set of individuals that are 
men, whereas in the latter system, it denotes an existential quantifier, and reference to 
a set of (relevant) individuals is only made in case alternatives need to be computed 
(for instance because of the presence of focus). The redefinition of semantic values in 
terms of sets has been argued to raise non-trivial technical questions. In particular, the 
semantic composition in Hamblin’s system has been shown to run into problems in 
cases where sets of alternatives combine with movement and variable binding (Shan 
2004, Romero and Novel this volume).  
A related, and perhaps more important difference concerns the operators that 
access the sets of alternatives: unlike in the Hamblin semantics approach where (sets 
of) alternatives can be selected by various operators (e.g. quantificational, 
interrogative), in multi-dimensional approaches, alternatives are only used by focus 
sensitive operators, such as only or even (and possibly their covert counterparts), i.e. 
they are not visible to quantificational operators (see however Aloni 2007 for a 
definition of alternative-sensitive modals). To my knowledge, at this stage there are 
no empirical arguments in the literature that could decide between these two systems 
(see the discussion in Chierchia to appear). More generally, any alternative-based 
system has to define and motivate an inventory of alternative-sensitive operators and 
their properties. Can an operator operate over various sets of alternatives, and if so, 
under what conditions? If there is more than one operator in a given configuration, 
how do the various operators interact? A related question is how do different kinds of 
alternatives (for instance scalar and focus alternatives) interact? Whereas many of 
these issues are a matter of empirical investigation, any alternative-based system 
should in principle be able to predict attested and unattested configurations with one 
or several operators and alternative sets. Many of the studies cited above assume that 
alternatives and alternative-sensitive operators can be used to capture and predict 
cross-linguistic variation in certain areas. The success of this enterprise, and the 
comparison between alternative-based systems, depends to a large extent on the 
answers to these and related questions.  
The proliferation of alternative-based accounts indicates that alternatives have 
become semantic/pragmatic objects, with designated rules of composition and 
interpretation and a delimited set of operators that can access them. However, for 
most phenomena mentioned above, one can also find proposals that do not employ 
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alternatives. This raises the question of the empirical gain of using alternatives. A 
proper answer to this question would involve a detailed comparison of the empirical 
coverage and predictions of alternative- and non-alternative-based approaches to a 
given phenomenon and the benefits of resorting to alternatives might very well vary 
across phenomena. There are however certain domains where the use of alternatives 
has led to substantial progress. Among them, polarity and free choice indefinites, for 
which a wide array of alternative-based proposals have been developed (e.g. 
Fauconnier 1975, Kadmon and Landman 1993, Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998, Lee and 
Horn 1994, Giannakidou 2001, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Farkas 2002, 2006, 
Dayal 2004, Aloni and van Rooij 2005, Aloni 2007, Chierchia 2006, to appear, 
among many others). Taken together, these studies offer extensive evidence that the 
properties of many polarity sensitive indefinites follow to a large extent from the 
set(s) of activated alternatives and the way they are factored into meaning. The 
advantages of alternative-based accounts for (at least certain classes of) polarity 
sensitive items are by now relatively uncontroversial (see however Giannakidou and 
Quer 2011 for some skepticism). Chierchia (to appear), building mainly on Krifka 
(1995) and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), pursues the more ambitious goal of 
showing that all patterns of polarity can be captured in a multi-dimensional 
alternatives-and-exhaustification framework, which is furthermore assumed to be 
responsible for implicature calculation. Variation in the polarity system is captured 
through a highly restricted number of parametrical choices, along two interconnected 
dimensions: (i) types of active alternatives and (ii) modes of exhaustification. 
Whether such a strongly unitary approach ultimately succeeds in capturing the 
attested diversity of polarity patterns remains a matter of empirical investigation. 
What is perhaps more important at this stage is the fact that the use of alternatives has 
facilitated the pursuit of this program. 
A related open issue concerns the possible advantages of generalizing 
alternative semantics to such a wide range of constructions. The conceptual appeal is 
obvious: if alternatives can be shown to do the work in one domain, it is tempting to 
exploit a similar mechanism elsewhere. The risk however is to take alternatives for 
granted and thus ignore the fact that there is currently no full-fledged theory of the 
source of alternatives or any prevailing view of how they should be computed. As 
alternative semantics keeps expanding, it is useful to bear these unresolved issues in 
mind in order to appreciate and compare the results of alternative-based theories.  
 
2. CONTENTS OF THE VOLUME  
 
The papers assembled in this volume share the assumption that alternatives provide a 
useful tool to account for certain linguistic phenomena and carefully explore its 
consequences. The first three chapters are directly concerned with implicature-based 
approaches to elements that give rise to ignorance or indifference inferences, such as 
disjunction or indefinite determiners like Spanish algún, German irgendein or English 
any.  
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito examine the status of the ignorance 
inference triggered by the use of determiners like algún, illustrated in (27) below: 
 
(27) María se casó        con  algún    médico , # en concreto con el   doctor Smith.  
 Maria SE married   with ALGÚN doctor       namely        with the doctor Smith 
 ‘Maria married some doctor, namely doctor Smith’ 
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Since Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), this component has often been analyzed as a 
quantity implicature, based on a competition between the assertion and a number of 
alternative propositions that correspond to different domains of quantification. This 
view has recently been challenged, in particular in work due to Aloni and Port, who 
argue that the inference should not be derived as an implicature. Alonso-Ovalle and 
Menéndez-Benito present further evidence against an implicature-based account, by 
arguing that the alternatives responsible for the ignorance effect are not sensitive to 
relevance, unlike what is known to be case for run-of-the mill implicatures, which are 
only drawn if contextually relevant. The authors further suggest a way to maintain the 
implicature approach, by proposing to factor in a pragmatic competition with other 
members of the paradigm, namely the plain indefinite determiner un. More generally, 
the facts discussed in this chapter emphasize the importance of a precise mechanism 
that determines what counts as an alternative.  
   Chierchia’s contribution can be viewed as defending the opposite theory, 
namely that all ignorance (and indifference) effects triggered by existential elements 
(such as indefinite determiners or disjunction) should be derived as implicatures. The 
starting point is the similarity of the free choice effects in (28) below: 
 
(28) a. You can have ice cream or cake. 
   a’. Each of the ice cream and the cake constitutes a legitimate choice. 
   b. You may have any cake. 
   b’. Each of the cakes constitutes a legitimate choice. 
 
Examining their behavior in modal and downward-entailing contexts, the paper 
argues for the unitary character of free choice disjunction (FCD) and morphologically 
marked free choice items (FCIs), like German irgendein, and offers a uniform, 
alternative-based theory of the two phenomena. Two main theses are defended: (i) 
that a unified account (of FCD and FCIs) is necessary (in view of their empirical 
similarities) and (ii) that a principled unified account is, in fact, possible, by making 
use of alternatives. More specifically, FCIs and FCD are assumed to activate the same 
sets of alternatives, which are of two types: scalar alternatives (corresponding to a 
conjunction) and domain alternatives (consisting of subdomains of the relevant set of 
individuals in the case of FCIs and each one of the disjuncts in the case of FCD). The 
observed inferences are argued to uniformly arise through recursive exhaustification 
of these sets of alternatives. To capture the absence of free choice effects with 
disjunction in plain, non-modal contexts (such as John or Mary will show up), 
Chierchia argues that the alternatives activated by disjunction (or plain indefinites like 
a or some) are in some sense optional, i.e. their use is subject to relevance. With FCIs 
on the other hand, alternatives are obligatorily factored into meaning (like focus 
alternatives), which explains why these items have a narrower distribution. The 
optional vs. obligatory activation of alternatives captures the differences between the 
two phenomena, thus enabling a uniform account of free choice effects, obtained on 
the basis of identical sets of alternatives, computed via an identical exhaustification 
mechanism.  
 In the chapter A Viability Constraint on Alternatives for Free Choice, Dayal 
adopts the framework developed by Chierchia and the assumption that FCIs are 
indefinites with a universal free choice implicature. However, she argues that the 
distributional restrictions displayed by FCIs should not be explained as a clash 
resulting from exhaustification over scalar and domain alternatives (as in Chierchia’s 
work), but rather as following from a viability constraint on alternatives, which 
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essentially requires a plurality of worlds over which alternatives can be distributed. 
This idea is exploited to capture a wide array of properties of FCIs, such as the 
distribution of partitive, non-partitive and numeral any (i.e. any one student) in 
episodic, modal and subtrigged contexts. Moreover, this constraint is taken as a basis 
to show the need for more refined empirical generalization regarding the distribution 
of FCIs in imperatives. More concretely, Dayal shows that imperatives do not license 
FCIs as easily as commonly assumed and discusses the role of contextual factors in 
satisfying the posited viability constraint on alternatives.   
 The following three chapters refine existing alternative-based proposals either 
by employing alternatives to capture new empirical facts or by proposing solutions to 
previously noticed problems raised by the use of alternatives. 
 Mayr’s paper compares two recent approaches to intervention effects in wh-
questions that both make crucial use of an alternative-based semantics: Beck (2006) 
and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), on the one hand, and Mayr (2012), on the other. 
As well-known, focus operators intervening between two wh-elements result in 
ungrammaticality (29): 
 
(29) a. *Welche Frau      hat   nur  der HANS wohin      eingeladen? 
      which   woman  has only the  Hans    where.to invited 
b. Welche Frau      hat wohin      nur  der HANS eingeladen?  
     which   woman has where.to only the Hans    invited  
    ‘Which woman did only Hans invite where?’ 
 
Similar effects have been identified with negative or universal quantifiers, although in 
a less systematic way. Beck (2006), much in the spirit of Kratzer and Shimoyama 
(2002), argues that intervention effects follow from the way in which alternatives are 
computed. More precisely, they can be captured by assuming that wh-elements 
contribute semantic alternatives to the computation in a way similar to focus. 
Essentially, the intervening focus (or quantificational) operator ‘consumes’ the 
alternatives introduced by the wh-element, leaving the interrogative operator without 
any alternatives on which to operate. Mayr argues that alternatives are essential in 
order to predict the correct set of interveners but shows that alternative semantics per 
se does not derive intervention effects. Specifically, he presents evidence that the 
focus-based generalization cannot capture the behavior of quantifiers with respect to 
intervention effects (in particular the fact that upward-entailing quantifiers are not 
interveners). To account for the more refined empirical generalization introduced in 
this and related work (Mayr 2012), the author argues in favor of a bi-dimensional 
alternative-based semantics where wh- and focus alternatives are kept separate.  
 Coppock and Beaver’s paper offers a unified analysis of the exclusives mere 
and only. The authors analyze both mere and only in terms of questions under 
discussion modeled as structures defined over sets of alternatives, where the 
alternatives are non-standard in two respects. First, by analyzing predicative uses of 
mere, they show that there are free variables in the alternatives. Second, the 
consideration of exclusives indicates that alternatives can be ranked by relations other 
than entailment; in this sense, both mere and only are scalar both in their positive 
component (“at least X”) and in their negative component (“at most X”). With 
evidence from negation, reason clauses, and emotive factive predicates, it is 
furthermore argued that the negative component of mere contributes to the at-issue 
meaning, while the positive component is presupposed, as has been previously argued 
for only. Taken together, the presence of unbounded variables in the alternatives and 
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the fact that exclusives can introduce presuppositional constraints on the salient set of 
alternatives are taken to motivate a more dynamic semantics for exclusives (as 
proposed in Coppock and Beaver 2011). 
 The compositional interpretation of structures that contain both sets of 
alternatives and variables is also addressed in Romero and Novel’s chapter. The 
starting point is the common assumption that languages contain structures whose 
semantic interpretation requires, at the same time, binding of variables via assignment 
functions (for pronoun and traces) and sets of alternatives (e.g. for indeterminate 
phrases in Japanese, free choice items, focus). This view was challenged in Shan 
(2004), where it is argued that compositional problems arise as soon as variable 
binding via assignments combines with sets of alternatives. Romero and Novel 
critically examine and propose solutions to the following three problems presented by 
Shan (i) over-generation of functional and pair-list readings in questions like Who saw 
nobody?; (ii) incorrect results when an XP binds into the "generator" of the set of 
alternatives (as in Which man1 sold which of his1 paintings?), and (iii) the (in)felicity 
of more complex examples involving the aforementioned binding relation (the 
distinction between Every man1 knows which painting of his1 is good and Every man1 
knows which heart of his1 is good). The paper shows that the problems raised by Shan 
can be circumvented, thus indicating that alternative semantics can successfully 
combine with movement and the binding of variables.  
 The final two chapters of the volume present experimental studies that confirm 
the role of contextual, syntactic or semantic factors in determining the correct set of 
alternatives.  
  Panizza and Romoli’s paper focuses on the linguistic behavior and on-line 
processing of the Italian word mai, an item that exhibits typical properties of 
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) on the one hand and of Negative-words (N-words) 
on the other. More precisely, like NPIs, mai exhibits sensitivity to the entailment 
properties of the sentence in which it occurs, but like N-words, mai gives rise to 
different meanings depending on its position with respect to the verb. The authors 
propose an alternative-based analysis of mai as an NPI with the additional capacity of 
introducing a covert negation in certain environments in pre-verbal position. The 
main goal is to investigate, through the case study of mai, the on-line processing of 
the theoretical mechanisms that are argued to be involved in its semantics, such as 
alternatives, exhaustification and insertion of covert negation. To this end, the 
authors make explicit hypotheses on how such mechanisms are connected to 
on-line processing, and test these hypotheses using the event related potential 
(ERP) methodology. The results indicate that during on-line processing, all sentences 
with mai, regardless of its position, are interpreted with obligatory exhaustification 
of the alternatives introduced by mai. If the result of exhaustification is not 
contradictory, mai retains its non-negative interpretation. If the result is contradictory, 
a reanalysis of the sentence is attempted, by inserting a covert negation to rescue the 
contradictory meaning arising from exhaustification of alternatives. The authors 
conclude that semantic properties of the context of occurrence – namely entailment 
patterns – play an important role in on-line processing of polarity sensitive items such 
as mai. Similar conclusions have been reached for the computation of scalar 
implicatures, also sensitive to entailment (Panizza, Chierchia and Clifton 2009), 
raising the question of whether the two phenomena rely on a similar mechanism.  
The volume closes with Bale and Barner’s study on Grammatical Alternatives 
and Pragmatic Development, which relies on evidence from language acquisition to 
address the nature of pragmatic inference, and the role of grammatical alternatives in 
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scalar implicatures. Previous studies suggest that children have difficulty computing 
simple scalar implicatures. Paradoxically, many children who are unable to compute 
scalar implicatures have no difficulty with similar pragmatic inferences, such as those 
involved in learning new words, or in reasoning about the knowledge states of other 
individuals. This raises the question: why are children so successful with some forms 
of pragmatic inference, but not with others? To answer this question, the authors 
investigate the specific processes involved in scalar implicature and compare them to 
those involved in word learning and other pragmatic tasks. Although these types of 
inference share many common elements, they differ in one crucial respect: the 
generation of alternatives. The present work, combined with past studies, suggests 
that children’s ability to compute pragmatic inferences differs depending on their 
familiarity with particular scales (i.e., the words or phrases that count as scalar 
alternatives). Children readily compute inferences for nouns and number words, but 
fail at very similar inferences that involve quantifiers and other types of function-
words (e.g., coordinators, modals, etc.). Furthermore, children easily compute 
implicatures when alternatives are provided explicitly by the context. Such evidence 
demonstrates that children possess sophisticated pragmatic abilities, but their ability 
to express such knowledge depends on access to grammatically determined sets of 
scalar alternatives (as originally proposed by Horn 1972). To compute quantity 
implicatures children must not only know the meanings of words like some and all, 
but they must learn that such words are related to one another as scalar alternatives. 
These data rule out the possibility that scales emerge automatically from the 
semantics of their members, and suggest that scales are not only grammatical in 
nature, but that they must associate with one another gradually over acquisition. 
Without exhausting the range of conceptual, theoretical and empirical issues 
raised by alternatives, the variety of alternative-based systems as well as the diversity 
of empirical phenomena addressed in this volume demonstrate the vitality of 
alternative-based semantics and offer clearer perspective on the many challenging 
questions that arise from its increasing range of applications.  
 
 22 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to thank Uli Sauerland for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier 
draft of this introduction. I am also grateful to the participants at the Workshop on 
alternative-based semantics held in October 2010 in Nantes for discussion of some of 
the issues presented here. All errors and omissions are mine. 
Notes 
 
1 Well-known examples include the development of Binding Theory (e.g. Reinhart 
1983, Fox 2000, Büring 2005, Reinhart 2006, Heim 2007 among many others), 
economy considerations involved in various types of movement, such as quantifier 
raising or wh-movement (e.g. Fox 2000, Reinhart 2006; see Müller and Sternefeld 
2000 for an overview of competition in syntax), the interpretation of reciprocals and 
plural predicates, regulated by the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (e.g. Dalrymple et 
al. 1994, Winter 2001), or frameworks such as Optimality Theory (e.g. Prince and 
Smolensky 1993, Hendriks and de Hoop 1997).  
2 Whether the scalar item is replaced with the next weaker or the next stronger item 
on its scale depends on the context: as is well-known, the consideration of stronger 
items gives rise to scalar implicatures in upward-entailing contexts only; in 
downward-entailing contexts a stronger assertion obtains by replacing the scalar item 
with a weaker scale-mate. In other words, what matters is the entailment relation 
between the sentences obtained by substituting scalar items, not the relation between 
the scalar items themselves (see Sauerland 2004). 
3 Similar questions are addressed in an alternative-based framework which we haven’t 
mentioned so far, namely inquisitive semantics (e.g. Groenendijk and Roelofsen 
2009, Ciardelli, Groenendijk and Roelofsen 2012). The approach seeks to redefine 
semantic meaning so as to capture not only informative (standard) meaning, but also 
inquisitive meaning (reflecting the interactive use of language in exchanging 
information). In this framework, unitary accounts have been proposed for questions 
and disjunctions, both of which raise an issue by presenting a set of alternatives and 
demanding that one of them be chosen.  
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